Blacklist Candidate Number 2008-05-31

Welcome to the Perishable Press “Blacklist Candidate” series. In this post, we continue our new tradition of exposing, humiliating and banishing spammers, crackers and other worthless scumbags..

Just under the wire! Even so, this month’s official Blacklist-Candidate article may be the last monthly installment of the series. Although additional BC articles may appear in the future, it is unlikely that they will continue as a regular monthly feature. Oh sure, I see the tears streaming down your face, but think about it: this is actually good news. After implementing the 3G Blacklist, finding decent blacklist candidates is becoming increasingly difficult. This is a good thing because it indicates that the new blacklist strategy is working. Nonetheless, every now and then, some brainless bozo will magically appear and poke around where it shouldn’t be poking. Such is the case with this month’s Blacklist Candidate Number 2008-05-31:

Come on down! You’re the next worthless turd to get banished from the site!

Synopsis

After a several quiet weeks in the access logs, IP address 210.210.119.145 suddenly rears its ugly head with a repeat single-vector exploit attempt. On May 8th, 2008 at 2:28 PM, IP address 210.210.119.145 made fifteen different non-existent resource requests in less than ten minutes. Each URL request targeted a legitimate, search-engine indexed URL with an appended “_vpi.xml” character string. Each of the 15 attempts record a user agent called “Firebat”. Let’s have a look at an excerpt from the attack log:

TIME: May 8th 2008, 02:28pm
404: *https://example.com/press/2007/07/_vpi.xml
SITE: https://example.com/
SOURCE: Perishable/Perishable
REFERRER: 
QUERY STRING: 
REMOTE ADDRESS: 210.210.119.145
USER AGENT: Firebat 2.7.12
REMOTE IDENTITY: 

TIME: May 8th 2008, 02:28pm
404: *https://example.com/press/2007/_vpi.xml
SITE: https://example.com/
SOURCE: Perishable/Perishable
REFERRER: 
QUERY STRING: 
REMOTE ADDRESS: 210.210.119.145
USER AGENT: Firebat 2.7.12
REMOTE IDENTITY: 

TIME: May 8th 2008, 02:28pm
404: *https://example.com/press/_vpi.xml
SITE: https://example.com/
SOURCE: Perishable/Perishable
REFERRER: 
QUERY STRING: 
REMOTE ADDRESS: 210.210.119.145
USER AGENT: Firebat 2.7.12
REMOTE IDENTITY:
.
.
.
[ + 12 similar records omitted for clarity ]

I know, I know, not nearly as exciting as some of the previous Blacklist Candidates, however, as the only bozo to apply, IP address 210.210.119.145 wins the prize.

Discussion

As mentioned, the entire round of attacks occurred over a period of approximately ten minutes. However, within that time-frame, the assault is broken down into three distinct, five-request chunks. The first five hits were executed in less than a minute, and demonstrate a deliberate loosening of URL specificity:

TIME: May 8th 2008, 02:28pm
404: *https://example.com/press/2007/07/16/allow-google-reader-to-access-hotlink-protected-images/_vpi.xml
SITE: https://example.com/
SOURCE: Perishable/Perishable
REFERRER: 
QUERY STRING: 
REMOTE ADDRESS: 210.210.119.145
USER AGENT: Firebat 2.7.12
REMOTE IDENTITY: 

TIME: May 8th 2008, 02:28pm
404: *https://example.com/press/2007/07/16/_vpi.xml
SITE: https://example.com/
SOURCE: Perishable/Perishable
REFERRER: 
QUERY STRING: 
REMOTE ADDRESS: 210.210.119.145
USER AGENT: Firebat 2.7.12
REMOTE IDENTITY: 

TIME: May 8th 2008, 02:28pm
404: *https://example.com/press/2007/07/_vpi.xml
SITE: https://example.com/
SOURCE: Perishable/Perishable
REFERRER: 
QUERY STRING: 
REMOTE ADDRESS: 210.210.119.145
USER AGENT: Firebat 2.7.12
REMOTE IDENTITY: 

TIME: May 8th 2008, 02:28pm
404: *https://example.com/press/2007/_vpi.xml
SITE: https://example.com/
SOURCE: Perishable/Perishable
REFERRER: 
QUERY STRING: 
REMOTE ADDRESS: 210.210.119.145
USER AGENT: Firebat 2.7.12
REMOTE IDENTITY: 

TIME: May 8th 2008, 02:28pm
404: *https://example.com/press/_vpi.xml
SITE: https://example.com/
SOURCE: Perishable/Perishable
REFERRER: 
QUERY STRING: 
REMOTE ADDRESS: 210.210.119.145
USER AGENT: Firebat 2.7.12
REMOTE IDENTITY:

Notice the pattern here:

• [...]/press/2007/07/16/allow-google-reader-to-access-hotlink-protected-images/_vpi.xml
• [...]/press/2007/07/16/_vpi.xml
• [...]/press/2007/07/_vpi.xml
• [...]/press/2007/_vpi.xml
• [...]/press/_vpi.xml

The legitimate portion of the target URL begins with a specific post, and proceeds with an upward traversal of the (permalink) directory structure. This same pattern is repeated in the subsequent two attacks, which also were executed in less than one minute each.

So to summarize the structure of the attack, we have three sets of scripted requests, each consisting of five URLs of decreasing directory specificity. The total duration of sequential attack execution is probably less than a couple of minutes. Scripted? Yes. Deliberate? Yes. Malicious? Definitely.

Identification

Here is what we know about the identity of this month’s Blacklist Candidate:

• IP Address: 210.210.119.145
• Reverse IP Lookup: 210-210-119-145.lan.sify.net

Complete reverse lookup courtesy of kloth.net:

Reverse Lookup Results

Host    145.119.210.210.in-addr.arpa
Type    PTR
Value   210-210-119-145.lan.sify.net

IP Address Contact Information

OrgName:    Asia Pacific Network Information Centre 
OrgID:      APNIC
Address:    PO Box 2131
City:       Milton
StateProv:  QLD
PostalCode: 4064
Country:    AU

ReferralServer: whois://whois.apnic.net

NetRange:   210.0.0.0 - 211.255.255.255 
CIDR:       210.0.0.0/7 
NetName:    APNIC-CIDR-BLK2
NetHandle:  NET-210-0-0-0-1
Parent:     
NetType:    Allocated to APNIC
NameServer: NS1.APNIC.NET
NameServer: NS3.APNIC.NET
NameServer: NS4.APNIC.NET
NameServer: NS-SEC.RIPE.NET
NameServer: TINNIE.ARIN.NET
NameServer: DNS1.TELSTRA.NET
Comment:    This IP address range is not registered in the ARIN database.
Comment:    For details, refer to the APNIC Whois Database via
Comment:    WHOIS.APNIC.NET or http://www.apnic.net/apnic-bin/whois2.pl
Comment:    ** IMPORTANT NOTE: APNIC is the Regional Internet Registry
Comment:    for the Asia Pacific region. APNIC does not operate networks
Comment:    using this IP address range and is not able to investigate
Comment:    spam or abuse reports relating to these addresses. For more
Comment:    help, refer to http://www.apnic.net/info/faq/abuse
Comment:    
RegDate:    1996-07-01
Updated:    2005-05-20

OrgTechHandle: AWC12-ARIN
OrgTechName:   APNIC Whois Contact 
OrgTechPhone:  +61 7 3858 3188
OrgTechEmail:  search-apnic-not-arin@apnic.net

# ARIN WHOIS database, last updated 2008-05-30 19:10

Blacklist

As discussed in the Building the 3G Blacklist series, securing your site against these types of malicious attacks is greatly facilitated by identifying and immunizing against common elements. For example, each of the logged requests for this month’s Blacklist Candidate are associated with the same IP address. Thus, we could prevent all future attacks from this specific address with the following HTAccess code:

# blacklist candidate 2008-05-31: block _vpi.xml attacks 
Deny from 210.210.119.145

..or, to block via PHP:

<?php // blacklist candidate 2008-05-31: block _vpi.xml attacks
$deny = array("210.210.119.145");
if (in_array ($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'], $deny)) {
   header("location: http://www.google.com/");
   exit();
} ?>

However, a much better approach to protecting your site from these so-called “_vpi.xml” attacks is to simply blacklist the malicious character string itself. In doing so, we can block this type of attack from any IP address. Users of the 3G Blacklist can prevent all future occurances of the “_vpi.xml” attack by adding a single line to the first part of the 3G Blacklist:

RedirectMatch 403 \_vpi\.xml

Done.

This concludes this edition of the Blacklist Candidate. Thanks for playing, #2008-05-31 — we wouldn’t have done it without you!

Download

For the purists among us, here is a copy of the logged activity recorded for this month’s Blacklist Candidate.

About the Author

Jeff Starr = Designer. Developer. Producer. Writer. Editor. Etc.